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Introduction: From Conflict Analysis to Peacebuilding Impact
In 2012, two well-established international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGOs) in the peacebuilding field, Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, 
published a joint report entitled “From Conflict Analysis to Peacebuilding 
Impact” (Hiscock and Dumasy 2012). This report was based on 18 conflict 
studies across a broad range of contexts, all focused on building the capacities of 
local actors to engage in participatory forms of conflict analysis as well as utilizing 
the insights gained for strategizing peacebuilding initiatives. The report’s main 
conclusion was that adequate conflict analysis is a key precondition for all types 
of effective peacebuilding initiatives. Two other notable conclusions were that the 
process and the ownership of the conflict analysis are as important as the results of 
the analysis. 
That study resonates with the current authors’ similar experiences in the 
context of the Insider Peacebuilders Platform (IPP) for the Deep South of 
Thailand.1 The IPP group was created at the beginning of 2011 as a joint initiative 
of a number of academic institutes in the Conflict and Peace Studies field, one 
state-based institution, and several academic and civil society organizations 
(CSOs).2 This platform was inspired by the observations of peace scholars and 
practitioners that, although civil society has been increasingly engaged in the 
region since 2007, few efforts have been put forward to bring the different actors 
together as a way to improve their joint strategizing and explore possibilities for 
more effective collaboration.
Intensive discussions within the core IPP team initially focused on how 
best to develop such an approach in light of the earlier failures of several 
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well-intentioned efforts to promote collaboration and coordination among 
peacebuilding activists. The failure of these efforts largely centered on the 
difficulty of finding a method to best pursue these goals. We then came across a 
concept developed previously by peacebuilding researcher and activist Robert 
Ricigliano (2003), the Network of Effective Action (NEA). Apart from the need 
for a holistic approach to peacebuilding, he emphasized utilizing creative ways to 
develop a common theory of action.
Ricigliano furthermore highlighted that instead of promoting this 
method within the context of a formalized network and an explicit division 
of responsibilities, it would be better achieved within a rather “chaordic” 
arrangement. By this he meant that the collaboration should be self-organizing, 
decentralized and flexible, and that the network should be as inclusive as possible, 
allowing space for joint learning.
It was the latter point that was most attractive to us. We decided that the 
initial focus of the IPP should be on joint learning—a joint conflict analysis to 
create a common understanding of the main challenges towards peacebuilding. 
We also expected that this joint learning might promote trust and confidence 
building among the participants that could later assist collaboration on joint 
projects. Finally, to emphasize the learning aspect of the IPP, we envisioned the 
joint meetings as events that would start with providing knowledge and skills on 
the assessment of conflicts in general which would then be applied to the specific 
case of Southern Thailand. We used the term conflict analysis tools to describe this 
process.3
The selection and sequencing of the tools was guided by three basic 
considerations:
1.  The tools should together support a systemic understanding of the main features 
and drivers of the conflict and not just assemble data (Koerppen, Ropers, and 
Giessmann 2011; Ricigliano 2012; Schirch 2013). 
2.  The sequencing of the tools should support step-by-step trust and confidence 
building among the participants. For this purpose we decided that tools which 
offered chances for consensus building even among adversaries, like the mapping of 
actors and their relationships, should come before those that could easily generate 
confrontational disputes, like the parties’ historical narratives.
3.  The tools should allow visualizations in the form of diagrams to support creativity 
within small working groups. For this purpose we screened a reasonable sample of 
the available literature on conflict analysis (Leonhardt 2002; Fisher et al. 2005; SDC 
2005; SIDA 2006; USAID 2012).
Regarding the composition of the IPP, our intention was not only to invite 
persons with an explicit understanding of working for “negative peace” in the 
sense of ending the violence, but also individuals close to one or the other party 
with an interest in changing the injustices and deeper drivers of conflict in the 
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region. In the end, the IPP not only comprised peacebuilders striving for some 
kind of impartiality or multipartiality, but also numerous political activists 
arguing for nonviolent change in the region. We decided to summarize these two 
groups under the category of Stakeholders and Insider Peacebuilders in order 
to emphasize that the IPP comprises a broad spectrum of persons with different 
motives, positions, and interests.  
This article aims to document the application of five key tools utilized in the 
context of the IPP between September 2011 and June 2012, as well as discuss the 
group dynamics and the learning that accompanied the process. We have also 
collected feedback from participants in the context of an Action Research project. 
The results have been published separately (Chaijaroenwatana et al. 2013). In this 
article our aim is twofold: we wish to assess the usefulness of Ricigliano’s concept, 
and also to share our insights on how to improve its effectiveness.   
The following section provides a brief overview of the conflict’s context and 
describes the development of the IPP, particularly with respect to the participants 
and their interests, and the organization of the workshops and other gatherings. 
In the main part we will outline the five key tools and how the participants made 
use of these tools, and then we will summarize the results as well as publish the 
feedback of the participants. In the final section we will review the lessons learned 
from this experience and also summarize a number of open questions requiring 
further research.
The IPP collaboration is an ongoing process. After the focus on the five 
conflict analysis tools covered in this article, the group began working on 
roadmaps for peace processes and engaging with the Track-1 peace dialogue 
efforts undertaken between February 2013 and the beginning of 2014. We will 
reflect on these more recent developments in a future article while limiting our 
focus here to the insights gathered from the conflict analysis phase. 
The Case of Southern Thailand and the Development of the Insider 
Peacebuilders Platform (IPP)
The conflict in the Deep South of Thailand has been well researched since its 
reescalation in 2004. The majority of this research has concluded that the conflict 
is deeply rooted in the history of the region involving the Thai state and the local 
Malay Muslim and Malay Patani populations, respectively. Essentially, it can 
best be described as an ethno-political legitimacy conflict (McCargo 2009; 2012; 
Abuza 2009; Satha-Anand 2009; Joll 2010; Barter 2011; Jitpiromsri and Engvall 
2013; Jory 2013).4
This research has also emphasized that this particular conflict—as in many 
similar cases—has developed a complex dynamism of its own, including the 
self-reproducing nature of high levels of violence as well as the interference 
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of non-politically driven violence. Finally, another feature that has triggered 
significant research is the enigmatic character of the resistance movement and its 
organizational set up. But this latter aspect has somewhat changed in light of the 
Peace Dialogue Process, which the Thai National Security Council (NSC) and 
the leading resistance organization, the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional: BRN), agreed to on February 28, 2013 (Lamey 2013). 
This process is currently in limbo due to the transitional government 
situation in Thailand, but it had already run into difficulties due to the lack of 
inclusivity, political will, and sound strategic planning on the part of both sides 
(IPP 2014; McCargo 2014; Tuansiri and Pathan 2014). Still, a large number of 
insiders agree that sooner or later a new, politically driven peace initiative is 
necessary to transform the conflict in a sustainable manner (Jitpiromsri 2014).     
During the past decade, a number of activities have been initiated to 
promote peace. While the majority of these efforts has focused on security- and 
development-related programs, there has also been a significant increase in 
initiatives by CSOs, academic institutions and individuals linked to various state 
institutions, particularly since 2007. As mentioned above, this was the context in 
which the idea of the IPP was proposed as a means of creating a kind of neutral 
space for peacebuilders and politically active stakeholders within the conflict 
(therefore called “insiders”) to collectively analyze the conflict and explore ways 
to transform it. This idea was endorsed by the previously mentioned constituent 
entities of the IPP who appointed the members of a core (management) team.
The selection of participants by this team was based on three basic 
considerations: first, persons with connections to some kind of reference group 
so that they could function as multipliers with respect to their home organization 
or constituency; second, peacebuilders and stakeholders who ideally represent 
the full spectrum of opinions surrounding the peaceful transformation of the 
conflict; and third, organizational affiliations and individual characteristics as 
well as adequate representation of women and youth. Based on these criteria the 
individual features would become important reference points for expanding the 
group as well as occasionally rotating participants to enhance the overall outreach 
of the IPP initiative. 
Altogether approximately 50 persons participated in five workshops and 
several follow-up working groups that took place between September 2011 and 
June 2012. The majority of these individuals were residents of the southern 
border region. They included state officials, religious leaders, business people, 
members of women and youth groups, teachers, academics, as well as civil society 
activists working on human rights, environmental and cultural issues, community 
development, education, peacebuilding, and political and governance reform.
As for the representation of identity groups, we regularly noticed an over-
representation of Malay Muslims in the IPP compared to Thai Buddhists and Thai 
Chinese.5 This was mainly due to the fact that more than 80% of the people living 
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in the region belong to this group, and it also reflects this group’s strong interest 
in the purpose of the IPP initiative. Several of the Thai Buddhist participants 
hailed from outside of the region, mainly from Bangkok, because they had either 
official responsibilities related to the South or a personal interest in conflict 
transformation. 
For the majority of participants, the IPP initiative provided a unique, 
but also challenging, opportunity to reflect upon and discuss their different 
perspectives and experiences regarding the conflict and its transformation. Some 
of them were attracted to the question of how the multiplicity of Track-2 to 
Track-3 peace initiatives in which they were involved—from dialogue projects to 
local peace journalism—might have some kind of macro-political impact. This 
was an issue we also discussed in the context of the “PEACE WRIT LARGE” and 
“peace writ little” discourse (Chigas and Woodrow 2009). For others, the primary 
appeal of the initiative was the opportunity to engage with people from different 
backgrounds holding radically different opinions.
Both of these aspects encouraged the team to furnish the initiative with 
some academic features in order to emphasize the need to learn about the current 
state of the art of conflict analysis as well as peacebuilding, and to encourage the 
participants to view the conflict from the perspective of the tools provided. Also, 
from a very practical security point of view, all workshops and follow-up working 
groups were organized on the Pattani campus of the Prince of Songkla University 
which provided a relatively safe space for this kind of engagement.
In terms of the working process, the core team was composed of 
representatives from the initiating partner organizations. Before starting 
each two- to three-day workshop the team would brainstorm on the detailed 
objectives, the composition of the group, the tools to be used and the agenda. 
In the event, the facilitation was led by a team of two more-senior facilitators, 
one Thai Buddhist and one Malay Muslim. Senior team members analyzed the 
conflicts and considered their application to other cases. Typically, the workshop 
was a mix of plenary meetings and breakout groups where most of the practical 
work took place.
The Joint Series on Conflict Analysis
This section will describe the rationale for the selection of the five tools, provide 
an overview of the applied methods, and then summarize the outcome. 
Conflict analysis is “a practical process of examining and understanding 
the reality of the conflict from a variety of perspectives” (Fisher et al. 2005, 17). 
A plethora of methods have been developed for this purpose over the past 40 
or so years. As mentioned above, for our purpose, selection of the tools was 
based on their capacity to support a systemic understanding of conflict (does 
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the combination of tools help to see the essence of the conflict?), build trust and 
confidence among the persons engaged in this exercise, and finally stimulate 
visualization of the issues in a practical way. While we attempted to apply all of 
the tools from the widely used scheme of Where, Who, Why, What, How, and 
When (Schirch 2013, 67-74), we began with the less difficult ones. The question 
we decided to leave out at this stage was the How question; that is, how the parties 
applied their power (violence, securitization, etc.), because we were concerned 
that this topic might prove to be too sensitive, especially at the beginning.
The sequencing of the five tools was based on the following questions:
1. Who are the main parties and stakeholders in the conflict? In addition, 
how do these actors relate to each other and how powerful are they? To address 
these issues, we employed the Actor—Relationship Mapping Tool, a visual 
technique used to illustrate the parties in the conflict and their relationships 
ranging from alliance to severe conflict. Participants were asked to use circles 
of different sizes to represent the various actors in the conflict. The size would 
depend on each actor’s importance to the conflict. After the actors were discussed, 
the participants were then asked to consider the quality of the relationships 
among these actors.  
2. What are the underlying issues that put parties in conflict with one 
another? In other words, what do they want to achieve? In order to differentiate 
between layers of issues, the widely used onion metaphor was introduced. This is a 
tool, which slices the onion into three layers. The outer layer represents the public 
positions presented by each party. The inner layer indicates their interests, or 
what the parties really want to achieve. Finally, the core layer portrays the needs 
and fears determining what they must have in the end, and what they most fear.
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Figure 1. Joint Series of Conflict A alysis Workshops
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3. What factors contribute to making conflicts violent and protracted? 
This activity focuses on the drivers of the conflict. All protracted conflicts have 
multiple, interlinked drivers that create the tragic self-reproduction of rivalry, 
confrontation, them-and-us perceptions, and violence. While one phenomenon 
results from a particular driver, it can then give rise to other drivers in a 
contiguous chain, which causes all drivers to be entangled. That is to say that 
most cause-effect relationships do not function in a linear fashion, but rather are 
linked together in a complex web relationship. These attributes reflect the fact 
that while each party acts to advance its respective objectives, they all in turn 
wind up constructing a system and generating complementary factors that drive 
and feed into the conflict itself. In the end, no single entity has control over the 
situation or the system as a whole (Koerppen, Ropers, and Giessmann 2011). 
Participants were first asked to choose some conflict-related phenomena and then 
identify factors that trigger and sustain those phenomena. Based on these causal 
factors, they were then asked to identify what drives the factors. With this tool, 
participants developed a more comprehensive understanding of why the conflict 
has reached its current protracted, seemingly unresolvable, stage. This enabled 
them to better understand the complexity of the situation and also to identify 
possible opportunities for intervention. 
4. What are the narratives6 of the conflict from the perspectives of the 
key actors and stakeholders? One way to understand how the parties perceive 
the conflict is to be aware of the different narratives of the conflict. Certainly, 
there will be no single narrative or single version of history. Instead, each party 
has a different historical recollection of how the conflict emerged according 
to its own point of view. And as the conflict has broadened and deepened, so 
have the collection of narratives circulated among the conflicting parties. The 
purpose of this tool was to elicit different versions of the narratives of history in 
order to make the participants aware of their differing perceptions and beliefs. 
Participants were first asked to form groups based on their ethnicity—Malay 
Muslim, Thai Buddhist, and Thai Chinese. Then they elaborated their narratives 
and documented them on a visualized timeline. The three resulting timelines 
were then shared with the other groups in the plenary.
5. What is the context of the conflict? This was the last step of the process 
of assessing the ongoing conflict, and at the same time a first step towards 
identifying potential factors for conflict transformation. In this exercise the 
context was divided into factors that contribute to peacebuilding, obstruct 
peace efforts, or others that were identified as ambivalent. This tool encouraged 
participants to reflect on the wider geopolitical context of the conflict as well as 
consider the other drivers of change outside the conflict system.      
This joint analysis process created a mixed picture of agreements and 
disagreements. Whenever possible, we encouraged the participants to work 
towards a synthesis or a merger of their results. For this purpose we introduced 
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the concept of “sufficient consensus”7 as a guideline to facilitate compromises. 
This helped stimulate dynamic discussions, searches for new information, and 
efforts to include different perspectives and opinions into the final analysis.
In the following section we will review the results from the five tools in 
terms of substance and process. This process created what we believe to be 
the first participatory conflict analysis of the Deep South by people with close 
associations to the two main conflicting parties. The analysis reflects a certain 
level of common, multiparty understanding of the conflict. We will add some 
observations on the participatory process and the implications for co-ownership 
of the results. Please note that all diagrams are simplified for the purpose of 
clarity.
Actor—Relationship Mapping Tool
This mapping exercise proved time consuming because, for most participants, 
both the methodology and the experience of “negotiating” the mapping in 
detail were new. Thus several follow-up steps by working groups were needed to 
generate the outcome shown in Figure 2.
The participants categorized the key actors into three major groups: the 
Thai State, the “liberation movement,” and civil society organizations (CSOs). 
Obviously, they identified the Thai State and the liberation movement as the 
main parties to the conflict, while the civil society sector was placed between 
these two parties in a nearly equidistant position. Within each segment they 
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identified a multiplicity of sub-groups. In addition to the three major groups, 
other actors included politicians, the media, human rights defenders, civil society 
organizations from outside the region, Thai society in general, Patani’s political 
exiles, international organizations, and foreign governments.
Interestingly, this tool enabled participants to exchange views on the 
importance of institutions, including the monarchy, which is rarely discussed 
in public. They also spent significant time discussing in great detail the level of 
influence, the strategies, and the relationships of all the major actors involved. 
It turned out that this tool triggered a deep dialogue among the participants. 
It is noteworthy that some Thai Buddhist participants later admitted that this 
particular exercise made them realize for the first time that the liberation 
movement did indeed exist and had played a significant role in the conflict. Of 
course, not all of them were willing to accept the claim of “liberation,” although 
the term was tolerated by most of the participants.  
Onion Tool on Position, Interest, Need, and Fear
When the onion tool was first introduced, discussion centered on the exact 
understanding of positions, interests, needs, and fears in similar exercises because 
these terms overlap significantly and can easily lead to misunderstandings. 
Nevertheless, their wide use in the negotiation arena has made them important 
parameters for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. 
Following the results of the first tool, the participants decided to focus not 
only on the two main conflicting actors, but also to apply the tool to the positions, 
interests, needs, and fears of the civil society sector as well (see Table 1). 
This exercise triggered some debate regarding the assessment of the militant 
Malay Muslim movements, particularly the BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional) as 
one of the main actors in the conflict. The majority of the participants assumed 
that the BRN’s position would be one of merdeka (freedom) as it applies to 
the formation of their own independent state. However, since there had been 
no public statement of this claim it remained an open question at the time of 
the exercise.8 Nevertheless, the result of the onion exercise led to an in-depth 
discussion of the next category of the interests and consideration of the question 
of how an assessment of the two sides could be bridged in some future peace 
process. The majority appeared to conclude that the gap between the parties did 
not appear to be irreconcilable, at least as far as mutual interests were concerned.
The discussion of needs and fears demonstrated the highest potential for 
facilitating a deeper understanding of each other’s underlying concerns. To 
promote this impact, we introduced a fishbowl setting in which one group (in 
this case a homogeneous one) talked among themselves about the other side’s 
concerns, while the remaining participants just listened to the conversation in 
the inner circle. However, in hindsight, perhaps we applied this method a bit too 
early, because it requires a substantive level of trust to share and listen attentively 
286 Norbert Ropers and Mathus Anuvatudom
Table 1. Positions, Interests, Needs, and Fears of Main Actors in the Conflict
Category Thai State Liberation Movement CSO sector
Position -  Sovereignty and territorial 
integrity: Thailand is one 
indivisible Kingdom
-  Independence from the 
Thai State, with its own 
Nation State
-  Peace and justice
-  People’s empowerment 
and self-determination 
Interest -  Ensure law and order 
through necessary measures 
to prevent and suppress 
violence
-  Centralization and 
upholding “Nation, Religion 
and Monarchy” that 
constitute national security 
-  Autonomy, political 
freedom
-  Power to determine 
how they live and how 
they allocate resources
-  Upholding equality; no 
discrimination
-  Harmony within 
pluralistic society 
-  More power to 
determine local affairs 
Need -  Protection of Thai identity 
and dignity of Thai State
-  Political stability
-  Freedom to live their 
lives according to 
religious faith and 
culture
-  Political participation 
and recognition
Fear -  Losing authority and 
territory
-  Being assimilated, 
ethnically, religiously 
and culturally to the 
extent of losing their 
Malay-Patani identity
-  Losing life and being 
unsecured 
Figure 3. Simplified Version of Conflict Drivers 
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to discourses on basic needs and fears.   
The complex system of conflict drivers generated by the participants can be 
illustrated in a simplified version as shown in Figure 3. The starting point and 
center of the diagram is Violent Incidents as the key indicators of the protracted 
conflict. Around this center three loops were identified to indicate connections 
among the various drivers of the protracted conflict. The first loop (line A) 
represents incidents of violence. This is an amalgamation of various events 
including targeted killings and bomb attacks. Participants were of the view that 
the violence is sparked by a combination of interlinking drivers. Some of these 
relate to perpetrators’ efforts to “defend their identity,” be it as a Thai Buddhist or 
as a Malay Muslim. Besides drivers protecting the cultural identities of each side, 
there are drivers linked to state officials’ retaliatory actions that are perceived, 
rightly or wrongly, as being of a humiliating nature. Furthermore, the Thai 
State has enforced an Emergency Decree (which gives security agencies special 
rights) as an instrument to address violence in the region. Yet the enforcement 
of the Emergency Decree is one of the factors that can be interpreted as denial 
of both justice and equal treatment, which in turn spurs retaliation against state 
officials. And these loops can finally feed upon themselves and create the trap of 
an ongoing protracted conflict. To break this loop, a radical change of one or the 
other driver is necessary.
The second loop (line B) is the circle involving conflict resolution efforts 
that represent attempts to reduce violence. Advocacy campaigns by CSOs to 
prevent human rights violations have been mounted in response to the actions 
of some state officials. Peace talks among individuals representing the Thai State 
and some factions of the Malay Muslim movement—as well as dialogue forums 
on decentralization—have been attempted as a means of promoting conflict 
transformation. But so far these efforts have had only limited impact, with the 
notable exception of efforts to reduce human rights violations. A large group of 
participants explained away this failure as reflecting the limitations of the Thai 
political system in terms of effective democratic participation and problem-
solving capacity. These factors are summarized in the third loop (line C), which 
describes specific obstacles to conflict resolution.
Conflict Narratives Tool
While working on the drivers of conflict some of the participants became lost 
in the multiplicity of the drivers and the complexities of their interaction. But 
after the completed mappings were reviewed and efforts were undertaken 
to make them aware of the possibility to move between “simplification” and 
“complexification,” this tool became an attractive focal point for understanding 
the essence of the conflict.9 It also offered entry points for the discussion of 
strategies for change. However, in light of the heavy self-reproducing character 
of this approach, it was decided to revisit it at a later date, after we had reviewed 
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other analytical tools. 
The participants were divided into three groups based on ethnicity: Malay 
Muslim, Thai Buddhist, and Thai Chinese. Each group prepared its own narrative 
on an extended landscape flipchart. The three visualizations of the narrative 
timelines were then presented and discussed in the plenary. Because this tool 
aimed to keep the different narratives separate, we had proposed that the first 
round of the plenary discussion should consist only of questions of clarification 
and understanding, allowing no immediate debate or comment. This turned 
out to be a helpful ground rule because the presentation of these fundamentally 
different narratives generated a long-lasting impact on the participants.
Briefly, the narrative of the Thai Buddhists illustrated that the land in the 
Deep South had been governed by the (former) Siamese state for a long time, 
having been populated by diverse groups of people with different ethnicities and 
religions, many of whom later converted to Islam. Nevertheless, these people 
of diverse backgrounds had lived together peacefully for centuries until armed 
guerilla groups were organized to drive a wedge between local residents and to 
resist the state authority for their self-interest. In contrast, the Malay people’s 
narrative was centered on the agony of a proud ethnic group, inheritors of the 
glorious history of the former Patani Kingdom. This Kingdom once possessed 
its own sovereignty and distinct cultural identity before it was subjected to 
aggression and oppression by the Siamese State. The injustice and discrimination 
still continues until the present day. These traumas lent legitimacy for the Malay 
Muslims to rise up and fight for justice.
Turning to the perspective of the Thai Chinese people, their narrative 
reflected a lack of shared history with the Siamese people. The Malay Muslim 
participants reacted with surprise at this admission, having assumed that the 
Chinese living in the area and the Thai Buddhists were similar. The Chinese 
participants emphasized that their ancestors had also suffered from the former 
Thai State’s policies to assimilate them. Yet they had managed to blend in and 
coexist with other groups around them. One explanation for this was that they 
viewed themselves as settlers, and not inhabitants.
For a large number of participants this tool proved to be an eye-opener 
because for the first time they were confronted with three radically different 
historical perspectives of the same region. While they had assumed that their 
perspectives would be different, they had not expected the perspectives to differ 
so widely. They also expressed surprise that the markers for sequencing the 
history of the region were so divergent. The team was concerned that the final 
plenary on this topic might lead to a wide-ranging dispute over what constituted 
the “true history,” but this was not how the discussion unfolded. Although some 
of the comments indeed pointed in this direction, they represented the voice of a 
distinct minority. Instead, it appeared that, at least as this stage of engagement, the 
participants were prepared to learn about these different historical perspectives. 
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Many of them would return to this experience during several of the follow-up 
meetings. 
No one initiated the idea of trying to combine or merge these narratives. 
Instead, the attitude was geared more toward learning about all the narratives and 
gaining a better understanding of how particular historical episodes had become 
starting points for different perceptions, glorifications, as well as traumatization. 
The team interpreted this experience as the need to find constructive ways of 
integrating this divided past into some kind of shared future. 
Context Tool
The fifth workshop focused on the broad dimension of context factors and how 
they might influence the conflict and future transformation. The tools were used 
to encourage participants to identify the following three categories of factors: (1) 
factors conducive to peacebuilding, (2) factors that would obstruct peace efforts, 
or, in other words, factors that would reinforce the status quo (as of 2012), and (3) 
ambivalent factors about which it was uncertain at the time whether they would 
contribute to, or obstruct, peacebuilding. These three factors are illustrated in 
Figure 4.
After the participants were divided into groups to analyze the factors in 
greater detail, they were asked to rank the factors in terms of importance (shown 
in parenthesis in Table 2). 
One interesting result was that the participants emphasized the influence 
of the changing international environment and the potential weight of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Association of Southeast 















Figure 4. Context of the Conflict
290 Norbert Ropers and Mathus Anuvatudom
Asian Nations (ASEAN). (The strong positive assessment of the OIC was most 
likely connected to its actual engagement in the country at the time of the 
workshop in 2012.) Also, most of them agreed that efforts aimed at conflict 
transformation should be part of a larger framework of factors that would 
somehow influence the situation on the ground. 
Table 2. Priorities of Conflict Context Factors
Ambivalent Factors Peace Promotion Factors Burdening Factors
-  Succession of the Monarchy 
(18)
-  Impact of ASEAN (14)
-  Funding/international 
support (6)
-  Malaysian government 
policy towards the conflict in 
the Deep South of Thailand 
(4)
-  Role of Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
(15)
-  Peace agreements abroad 
(Aceh, Timor) (8)
-  Role of academia in 
stimulating debates on 
decentralization (6)
-  Role of United Malays 
National Organization (the 
ruling party in Malaysia) as 
intermediary (6)
-  International NGOs (4) 
-  Incoherence in national 
security policy (8)
-  Hardline nationalism 
ideology (8)
-  Instability of Thai politics (8)
-  “Terrorism” discourse (6)
-  Elite class profits from 
resources (5)
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- Role of UMNO (United 
Malays National Organization 
- the ruling party in Malaysia) 
as intermediary (6) 
- International NGOs (4)  
- Incoherence in national 
security policy (8) 
- Hardline nationalism ideology 
(8) 
- Instability of Thai polit cs (8) 
- “Terrorism” discourse (6) 
- Elite class profits from 
resources (5) 
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The diagram in Figure 5 captures some of the essentials of the conflict 
analysis collectively achieved by the participants. The Thai state, the Patani 
liberation movement, and the civil society sector comprise three communities 
as the main actors derived from the Actor—Relationship Mapping Tool. The 
Onion Tool helped participants to identify positions and interests of the actors 
while the Narratives Tool enabled them to elaborate the different narratives of 
Malay Muslim, Thai Buddhist, and Thai Chinese peoples. Factors that fuelled the 
conflict were discussed with the help of the Drivers of Conflict Tool. Finally, the 
Context Tool equipped them to analyze the impact of mainstream Thai society 
and the international community. This diagram was used to summarize the 
analysis with the participants and to assist reflection on the next steps in joint 
engagement towards conflict transformation. The feedback of the participants, 
which will be summarized in the next section, was to a great extent related to the 
fact that the process encouraged a circular perspective on the conflict; that is, an 
analysis which reviewed its history, actors, issues, and dynamism from different 
angles, but always with the aim of exploring and understanding the core drivers 
and their interaction. 
Conclusions: Joint Learning as the Key Component of Peacebuilding 
The IPP process has helped to create and nurture a mixed group of peacebuilders 
and stakeholders committed to a peaceful transformation of the Southern 
Thailand conflict. This process started in 2011 with the conceptual inspiration 
of Ricigliano’s network of effective action, which is based on the assumption 
that a non-hierarchical joint learning process among activists could be a more 
effective method for promoting peacebuilding than organized structures based 
on complementarity and collaboration. We were particularly interested in the 
question of what kind of tools and didactic arrangements would be helpful in 
enabling persons with different backgrounds vis-à-vis the conflict to engage 
constructively with one another and to prepare them for undertaking joint 
activities. Regarding this question, our main conclusion is that joint conflict 
analysis is indeed a promising tool to prepare and nurture multi-party peace 
constituencies. Beyond this general observation, we collected several specific 
insights that ought to improve joint learning, generate shared knowledge, and 
move towards joint peacebuilding efforts:
1.  The sequencing of conflict analysis tools is an important aspect for 
supporting a process of trust-building interaction and shared knowledge 
generation. In our case the Mapping of Actors and Relationships served 
as a useful first tool to allow all participants to share their actor-specific 
knowledge and to profit from the insights of others without the need for 
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any kind of taking sides. The possibility of working towards a “sufficiently 
consensual” mapping makes this tool particularly attractive for gaining 
the empowering experience of reaching agreement (albeit limited) across 
different opinions. 
2.  As a crucial element for making conflict analysis tools attractive and 
effective for joint learning, many participants emphasized two aspects: 
first, that they trigger some kind of “aha” experience of new and 
sometimes surprising insights, and second, that they can be visualized in a 
group arrangement to facilitate an in-depth conversation about the shared 
knowledge generated.
3.  Tools that are, by definition, difficult to lead to any early agreement (e.g., 
the sharing of different interests, feelings, needs, and fears of the parties 
and their different historical narratives) are nevertheless crucial. They 
are important for enabling people to change perspectives and to move 
towards deeper levels of understanding and respect. But these tools should 
only be introduced after the participants have developed sufficient trust 
in each other and have collected empowering experiences of arriving at 
agreements using other tools.
4.  For achieving personal trust and confidence building as well as 
substantive results using joint conflict analysis, our experience is that it 
helps to regularly shift the interaction in the workshops between work 
in homogeneous and heterogeneous identity groups (in addition to the 
traditional mode of shifting between plenaries and breakout groups). This 
approach acknowledges and respects differences, but also encourages the 
participants to change perspectives and find ways of communicating these 
differences in a constructive manner.
5.  At the end of the day, the most critical tools are those which help the 
participants better understand how the conflict emerged and became 
protracted because none of the driving parties acting alone could contain 
or control the conflict. This aspect is best captured in tools that emphasize 
the systemic character of the conflict, such as mapping the drivers of 
conflict. Reaching this stage in a joint conflict analysis is critical because 
it can trigger ambivalent reactions in the participants. On the one hand, 
it underlines the self-fuelling dynamism of the conflict and can trigger a 
feeling of resignation in light of these strong forces. On the other hand, it 
offers a number of entry points for peaceful change while providing the 
participants with an understanding that efforts for negative and positive 
peace are closely connected with each other. 
As for the unresolved challenges for practical peace work and open questions for 
further research, we hope to learn from colleagues engaged in similar initiatives. 
To this end we have identified three key points. First, the initial challenge is 
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about the scaling up of this kind of work. The approach of joint learning in a 
mixed group of peacebuilders and stakeholder representatives was possible in a 
workshop setting of, at most, 60 people. The pioneering character of the initiative 
and this particular size enabled us to ensure a sufficiently broad composition 
representing the identity groups and partisan backgrounds of the participants. 
As previously mentioned, many of the participants subsequently made use of the 
tools and the experiences in their own constituent organizations and networks. 
But they were often confronted by the problem that these constituencies were 
rather homogeneous, which meant that they often lacked the crosscutting 
element of the joint learning approach. Second, another challenge, which is partly 
connected to the first one, is how to ensure the sufficient involvement of Thai 
Buddhist and Thai Chinese people living in the three southernmost provinces. 
While they represent the overwhelming majority of people in Thailand, these 
groups are influential minorities in the region. Many of them are torn between 
supporting some kind of status quo policy to ensure their security and wellbeing, 
on the one hand, and the wish to contribute to a new peaceful settlement 
that would end the violence, on the other. Lastly, the shift from the phase of 
conflict analysis to envisioning and actually working on conflict transformation 
has energized the IPP participants, particularly due to the fact that the Thai 
government and the BRN initiated an official peace dialogue process in 2013. 
How this Track-1 process will be taken forward under the current political 
circumstances facing the country is an open question. But it is likely that civil 
society actors and Malay Muslim political activists will play a more visible 
role in preventing the situation on the ground from deteriorating again, as has 
happened in many comparable situations when a failed Track-1 effort has led 
to a reescalation of violence. From the perspective of the IPP a key question is, 
therefore, how to best make use of this model of joint learning with respect to the 
future. This is what inspires our current work, and we welcome any feedback and 
suggestions our readers may have.  
Notes
1. The terms “Deep South of Thailand” and “Southern Thailand” are used in this article 
interchangeably to represent the region comprised by the three most southern provinces 
of Thailand (Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala) plus four districts of Songkla Province with 
a Malay Muslim majority population. Occasionally we will also use the terms Pattani 
(official Thai name) or Patani (Malay spelling) for the former Kingdom, and Sultanate 
as a name for the overall region. The IPP generated the term Pat(t)ani to emphasize the 
need for an inclusive term acknowledging the multicultural character of the region. The 
authors are personally involved in the work of the IPP. We are grateful to our colleagues for 
their inspiring collaboration and feedback on this field note, but the responsibility for any 
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shortcomings rests with us.
2.  The group comprised the Center for Conflict Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD) 
and the Institute for Peace Studies (IPS) at Prince of Songkla University (PSU), the Center 
for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) at Chulalongkorn University, the Peace Information 
Center (PIC) at Thammasat University, the Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies 
at Mahidol University, the Office of Peace and Governance at King Prajadhipok’s Institute 
(KPI), Deep South Watch (DSW), and the Berghof Foundation Liaison Bangkok.   
3.  Lisa Schirch has recently proposed that the term “lens” might be more appropriate 
than “tools” to emphasize the need for understanding the holistic character of conflict 
instead of taking it apart (2013, 24)—a good point. Our experience though is that for a 
capacity-building event the term “tool” has a strong appeal for the participants insofar as 
their emphasis is on learning.
4.  As in many other similar situations, the terminology on and around the “conflict” 
(“insurgency” or khwam mai sangop [disturbance or unrest]) is contested. We will use the 
academically widely accepted term “conflict.”
5.  The population in the Deep South of Thailand is comprised of three ethno-religious 
groups: Thai-Buddhist, Malay-Muslim, and Chinese. Based on data from Ministry 
of Interior, as of 2004, the percentage of Muslims in the region is 85.16% and that of 
Buddhists 14.53%. Most of the ethnic Chinese are Buddhists. All ethno-religious groups 
are considered Thai citizens. The Malay-Muslims are the majority in the region, but in the 
country as a whole they are a minority. 
6.  “Narrative” in this joint learning process is defined as collective memories of one 
particular group of people sharing any given identity. It is a set of stories about the conflict 
history seen through their respective lenses. These stories lend legitimacy to actions by 
each side, why they decide to do certain things, including pursuing armed struggle or 
using force to settle conflict. Typically there are at least two perspectives to a narrative: one 
side features the narrator themselves as victims, with numerous grievances, while the other 
emphasizes the legitimacy of their side.   
7. This term is used differently with respect to the exact definition of “sufficient.” A 
widely used interpretation is that a majority of all participating conflict groups agrees with 
an outcome or decision.  
8.  During the time of the workshop, the peace dialogue process between representatives 
of the Royal Thai Government and the BRN had not yet been initiated. The General 
Consensus on Peace Dialogue Process between the two parties was later signed on 
February 28, 2013.
9.  In systemic discourse these focal points or clusters are also called “centers of gravity” 
(Schirch 2013, 24) or “attractors” (Coleman 2011, 77).
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